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Analysis of new threats to online banking
authentication schemes
Oscar Delgado1, A. Fu´ster-Sabater1, and J.M. Sierra2
Abstract—In this work it is shown how current online banking
and payment methods are highly insecure. All the countermea-
sures currently used by financial institutions are vulnerable to
some kind of attack, mainly to the recent and powerful last
generation trojans, which are able to defeat mechanisms as strong
as SSL sessions or two-factor authentication schemes. We point
out the problems of these models and we propose a mobile phone
OTP scheme with a new method for the challenge generation.
Index Terms—Online banking, authentication, trojan horses.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the arrival of traditional mafias to Internet, fraudhas been professionalized and the old reconnaissance
desire has become into the possibility of making much money.
For example, in Spain, according to the periodic polls about
Internet use, the concern to fraud is usually the first reason of
distrust about e-commerce [8]. In fact, this is not surprising,
because according to these reports, 72% of the analyzed
computers was infected by some type of malware, half of it
classified as “dangerous”, either for the computer integrity or
for the privacy of its data. Other interesting conclusion, that
will be analyzed in detail in section III-B, makes reference to
the inability of antivirus software, due to different reasons, for
reliable detecting and neutralizing these kind of threat.
Clearly, the reason of this growth is the online fraud
evolution. For example, phishing is one of the most sophis-
ticated, organized and innovative technological crime waves
ever faced by online business. The term was coined in 1996
by crackers attempting to steal AOL account credentials. Since
the beginning of 2004, phishing has remained the most wide-
spread online fraud technique, but in the last years this has
changed. Fraudsters have new tools at their disposal and are
able to adapt more rapidly than ever. These new tools are
mostly malware in general and trojan horses in particular.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Most re-
cent and important threats to the e-commerce development,
including phishing, pharming and last generation trojans, are
analyzed in sections 2 and 3. Section 4 analyzes the relation
between malware and cryptography, and some misconceptions
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about it. Section 5 presents and analyzes the current online-
banking authentication schemes and their related problems.
A new method for generating mobile phone OTP tokens and
other solutions are introduced in section 6. Finally, conclusions
are presented in section 7.
II. RECENT THREATS TO ONLINE BANKING
Some of the most recent threats to the development of e-
commerce include phishing and pharming attacks and, overall,
last generation trojan horses. These are supplied with new and
powerful capabilities, which make them able to even defeat the
most sophisticated authentication protocols such as two-factor
schemes.
A. Phishing
Phishing has probably been the most important and techni-
cally complex wave of organized crime that e-commerce fraud
has faced in recent years. Although the first cases of phishing
were reported in 1996 against AOL user passwords, the first
financial institution, eGold, was not attacked till 2001.
Since then, the number of reported cases has grown, with
annual increases of nearly 300%, till reach, for example, the
1.184 reported cases in Spain in 2006. Roughly speaking,
the 85% of them was directed against financial institutions,
although a small tendency to drop can be appreciated due
mainly to the improvement in the management attacks and
fraudulent sites shutdowns. The new objectives include, among
others, ISP’s, NGO’s and even government institutions, such
as the Spanish National Statistics Institute.
B. Pharming
Given the limited success of these efforts, fraudsters began
to use other methods, such as pharming. Pharming is an attack
to the name resolution system of a operating system, in such a
way that this provides a false IP address for a specific domain.
There is even a more sophisticated and dangerous attack,
whose objectives are name servers instead of the operating
system. In this case, the attack is often called DNS poisoning
and it affects to all customers who use the attacked name
server.
This attack becomes particularly dangerous if it is per-
formed by, for example, a trojan. In this case, the website
of any banking institution can be redirected to a fraudulent
domain, where the fraudster previously placed a copy of the
original site.
In some curious cases, the phishers went as far as to even
buy a digital certificate to a recognized certification authority
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Type Proportion of thetotal
4 with year
2007
4 with year
2000
Trojans 91.79% +4.5% +85%
Viruses 4.70% -1.5% -76%
Others 3.51% -1.5% -8%
TABLE I
EVOLUTION OF THE TYPE OF MALWARE
in order to be able to establish copies of some bank web pages.
In this way, the page could be served even under HTTPS,
without the browser warning message appearing to the user.
On the other hand, this message is almost unintelligible for
most users, so that, in practice, it is not very useful.
III. LAST GENERATION TROJANS
Traditional methods used by phishers, as massive spam,
similar domains1 and other somewhat crude tricks, have been
gradually losing effectiveness, as the problem has reached the
media and is already known by the general public. As a result,
criminals have been forced to seek new ways to carry out their
frauds.
In this sense, and due to their powerful features, trojan
horses are the perfect tool. Although they never were the most
popular code among malware creators, with the recent fraud
professionalization and the resulting change in the objectives
pursued, their use has greatly increased: since 2000 the amount
of malware created every year has grown 25,000%. On the
other hand, the type of malware most frequently used by
cyber-crooks has also changed over the years. Whereas in
2000 viruses accounted for 81% of all new malware detected,
in 2007 this figure barely reached 5%. In the same period,
trojans have increased from 14 to more than 90%, reaching
the amazing volume of 15.292 new malicious programs each
month. Table I summarizes these data.
This change is clearly driven by the new objectives of
malware creators. Viruses were closely related to massive
epidemics and the quest for notoriety, while trojans are the
weapon of choice for those looking for profit. This is clearly
indicated by the fact that almost 70% of the new written
trojans are specifically designed for capturing online banking
credentials.
Figure 2 shows detailed data year-by-year and confirms
this tendency. Data fit surprisingly, even suspiciously, well
to an exponential behavior. Despite the fact that there are
clear suspicions that security vendors over-report the volume
of incidents and malware [2], these figures can be useful for
getting a general idea and confirm, in any case, the undeniable
growth in the malware creation.
A. Infection vectors
Other important issue with malware is the so called infection
vector. The infection vector is just the way these programs
infect the host computers. The great majority of this kind of
malware does not have autoreplication capability, like worms,
so they must use other ways to propagate.
1For example, registering a domain like www.foo1bank.com instead of
www.foolbank.com, trying to cheat the user.
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1) P2P networks: P2P networks, which do not have inte-
grated security mechanisms, are a natural propagation method
for malware. According to some recent studies [9], almost
the 50% of the executable binaries found on P2P networks
are infected with some kind of malware. For increasing the
attractive of binaries, and to persuade users to download and
execute them, most of the binaries are hidden using the world’s
oldest lure: sex.
2) Spam : Spam has been for year the most used method
for the propagation of malware, but it has nowadays falling
into disuse. The reasons are, basically, the bulk implantation
of mail gateways with antivirus capability and limitation on
executable attachments by large providers of free email like
GMail or Hotmail. Despite this fact, some security vendors
estimate that nearly 50% of malicious code is propagated via
e-mail yet [13].
3) Web : Other infection vector, more and more used
by fraudsters, is infection via Web. By exploiting browser’s
vulnerabilities, they manage to infect the user’s computer by
just visiting a malicious website.
The process begins with the compromise of existing web-
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Fig. 3. Web infection
sites, if is possible with a great number of visits. In order
to do so, they usually use automatic tools, that are able to
collect in a short period of time hundreds of infected machines.
Other surprising and worrying method, recently discovered,
uses the so called affiliate marketing programs, which pay
web site operators to install malware on its visitor’s computers
using exploits. In return, the webmaster receives a commission
ranging from 0.08$ to 0.50 per infection [2], [5].
B. (In)efficiency of antivirus software
Other reason for the spectacular growth of malware is the
inability of the antivirus software to successfully detect it.
It is true that this is not an easy task, because of trojans
are increasingly complex programs, that include many auto-
protection and stealth techniques [4].
But the main difficulty for detecting this new kind of
malware is its very high mutation rate, up to six in the same
day. In order to do so, attackers use automatic tools, that allow
to easily and quickly generate these mutations. The changes
are minimal, often without changes in the behavior of the
trojan, but differently enough to avoid the antivirus detection.
All these reasons mean that antivirus software, even of high
quality and often updated, is no longer a guarantee of security
against this new kind of threat.
C. Malware economics
A long time ago, creation of malware stopped being an
exclusive activity for teenagers freaks. According to the
antivirus companies, 75% of malware detected in the last
quarterly of the last year were designed to obtain money
fraudulently. Nowadays this is a very lucrative business, which
moves many million dollars around the world, and that has
gone progressively being occupied by the traditional organized
Fig. 4. Real HTML injection example
crime, which can easily use its established networks for money
laundering.
Specialization has reached online fraud too, in such a way
that the chain of the fraud process has fragmented in parts
clearly differentiated. The first link of the chain is composed
by the coders of malware: people with technical knowledge,
who sell their creations using all type of marketing strategies,
e.g. in specialized forums, where this type of malware is
sold, it is easy to find special offers, discounts by volume or
warranties of that the trojans are not detected by any antivirus
software.
Once the buyer has chosen the product, he/she contacts
the seller, often using the ICQ protocol, and a final price
is negotiated. Eventually the transaction is made, usually
through WebMoney, the new preferred system of electronic
payment for the fraudsters. In fact, often the prices are directly
announced in WMZ, the official currency of WebMoney,
equivalent to 1 dollar USA.
D. Last Trojan Techniques: HTML Injection
This is one of the state-of-the-art techniques used by the last
generation of malware, specifically by an increasingly number
of banking trojans. It consists in modifying the HTML code of
the attacked web page (typically, the login page of an online
bank), before this is presented to user. Figure 4 shows a real
attack to a well-known American bank, and how the page’s
original look and HTML code are modified to trick the user.
Till the present, this technique has been almost exclusively
implemented by using the Browser Helper Object (BHO)
interface, defined by Microsoft for Internet Explorer in 1997.
Therefore, the first cases for other browsers, as Firefox, have
been recently discovered. The original goal of the interface
is, of course, legitimate and a large number of known appli-
cations, like the PDF reader plug-in or the Google toolbar,
make use of it. On the other hand, it has a very powerful
side effect: it provides access to the traffic in the clear of the
browser, before and after it is encrypted by, for example, an
SSL session.
As it can be easily seen, if the purpose of the program
that uses the interface is fraudulent, the consequences are
potentially very dangerous. The main reason is that this
attack is almost undetectable for the majority of non-expert
users because it does not break the usual protection measures
proposed by the financial institutions:
• The ‘lock’ in the browser window is closed, that is, the
encryption has not been defeated (but the attacker has
access to all communications in the clear).
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• The source URL is correct. The user has not been
redirected to the source forged. The origin of the data has
not been manipulated, just its presentation to the user.
Despite the fact that this is a vulnerability that mainly affects
to Internet Explorer, its scope is broader. In fact, it has
nothing to do with the old and useless controversy about the
intrinsic security of each browser. It seems logic that if Internet
Explorer is the most attacked browser is due to the fact that
it is the most widely used and, therefore, the most attractive
to attackers.
The core of the matter is that, taking into account that this
attack manipulates date in the application layer, a SSL session,
that operates protecting only lower levels, is not a security
warranty against this kind of threats. Therefore, it can be said
that a browser is not a secure platform to manage sensitive
information anymore.
As a result of this fact, most of the current banking trojans
are written using this interface, because they are able to
easily bypass the current countermeasures taken by online
banking, as virtual keyboards or, even, the encryption of the
communication. As we will see in next section, this malware
can even defeat more sophisticated authentication schemes,
like two-factor, by performing a real-time man-in-the-middle
attack.
IV. MALWARE AND CRYPTOGRAPHY
As it is known, the security of a system can be seen
as a chain of protection methods, and the global level is
just as strong as its weakest link. From this point of view,
cryptography is no more than other link in the chain.
Fortunately, most of the times it is the strongest link,
so cryptography is usually considered like the philosopher’s
stone, that could provide the definitive protection against all
the threats to electronic commerce.
In theory, this could be probably so, but cryptography
now on the market does not provide the level of security it
advertises. Most systems are not designed and implemented
in concert with cryptographers, but by engineers who think of
cryptography just as another component.
A. What cryptography can and cannot do
In any case, practical cryptography is rarely broken through
the mathematics; other parts of systems are much easier to
break. The best protocol ever invented can fall to an easy
attack if no one pays attention to the more complex and
subtle implementation issues. Netscape’s bug in the random-
number generator is an example [7]. Flaws can be anywhere:
the threat model, the system design, the software or hardware
implementation, and the system management. On the other
hand, fatal bugs may be far from the security portion of the
software too; a design decision that has nothing to do with
security can nonetheless create a security flaw.
In addition to implementation issues, there are also con-
sequences when cryptographic protocols are not designed
by experienced cryptologists. The well-known flaw in the
WEP protocol could be, maybe, the best example [6]. Any
cryptographer knows the birthday paradox and, thus, that a 24-
bit initialization vector (IV) would be completely insufficient,
because, if randomly chosen, it would have 50% chances of
collisions after less of 5000 encryptions.
In any case, there are only 16 million IV values and, in
heavy-loaded networks, these could run out in a few minutes.
When no implementation or design error has been committed,
and the cryptographic protocols have been carefully planned,
you still have to face malware and the type of trojans we have
analyzed in the previous sections.
We think this new class of malware, with so powerful
characteristics, is not only a perfect tool for fraudsters, but
also probably the most serious threat to the development of
the electronic commerce. If these trojans are able, as we are
seeing, to easily bypass every cryptographic protection, then
these lose all their effectiveness. It is important to make notice
that these problems had nothing to do with mathematics or de-
sign flaws, but to implementation and, overall, the environment
where these protocols are carried out, as we will analyze in
the next section.
For example, a SSL channel is no longer a protection against
this last-generation trojans. This, of course, does not mean that
SSL protocol has been broken or it is not necessary anymore.
Due to the place where the fraudsters are hooked the trojans,
they have access to all the traffic interchanged between the
browser and the web server in the clear. So if you are infected,
all the classical protection measures do not offer protection any
longer.
V. CURRENT ONLINE-BANKING AUTHENTICATION
SCHEMES
Maybe the most representative example of the relation
between malware and cryptography are the authentication
mechanisms. In addition to the fact that a PC is an inherently
insecure environment, the situation gets worse for online
banking. The reason is that schemes of authentication provided
by the banking organizations are not balanced, in the sense
that the authentication process is performed exclusively at one
end of the architecture: the user’s computer.
Furthermore, this process is still carried out in many cases
using weak schemes, like the traditional user/password. Even
with two-factor schemes all the process takes place, exclu-
sively, in the user side of the equation. Due to this, if this
authentication process is hacked, by using a trojan or a simple
credentials theft, the bank has no way to distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate clients.
A. Virtual keyboards
The first cases of this type of trojans used old viral tech-
niques, as capturing keyboard keystrokes, looking for words
such as “password”. To fight them, banks began using virtual
keyboards, so common today, although they are completely
useless against some types of trojans. Figure 5 shows a real
example from a Spanish bank.
In any case, just as expected the next movement of criminals
came promptly. They provided trojans with the ability to
make screenshots and save small video clips. After that,
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Fig. 5. A virtual keyboard
next generation trojans, which are situated inside the browser
itself, completely defeated these countermeasures and, at the
moment, they should be considered completely useless.
B. Two-factor authentication
The most prevalent approach to reducing the impact of data
compromise is known as two-factor authentication. This refers
to requiring proof of two out of the known three criteria
(something you are, you have or you know) to permit a
transaction to occur.
Second-factor authentication has been implemented in sev-
eral ways in online banking, ranging from matrix cards or
hardware tokens, to the use of mobile phones. Table II
summarizes currently used two-factor authentication schemes,
discussing advantages and disadvantages of each approach.
It is import to remark that almost all of these schemes can be
easily defeated by last generation trojans. Till the present, just
one variation on the mobile phone scheme could be considered
secure against this threat. But, unfortunately, even this proposal
has some drawbacks too, which will be analyzed in detail in
section V-D.
C. Attacking current two-factor schemes
In this section it is shown how a last generation trojan can
defeat a two-factor authentication scheme. The attack could
be carried out as follows:
1) The user has been infected by a banker trojan through
one the ways shown in section III-A. Victim is user of
a online bank that uses some two-factor authentication
scheme, for example, a matrix card. Strong authentica-
tion process can be performed at login time or when a
transfer is requested. The attack works in any case.
2) Trojan waits the user initiates a transfer process. At that
moment, the user will have to provide the bank with the
next valid one-time password from his matrix card. The
OTP is then captured, with other sensitive data, as user’s
name, login password or account number.
3) Trojan silently changes the destination number account
to other of its election and allows the transfer process
to continue. The amount to transfer will obviously be
changed too. At the same time, the trojan shows the
user the correct account number. If this attack is well
implemented, it is almost undetectable.
This attack, with slightly variations for adapting it to every
environment, could be performed against any two-factor au-
thentication carried out in the user’s computer exclusively.
The cause of the problem is not in the authentication
scheme, which is perfectly secure in theory, but in the fact
that it is performed in a inherently insecure environment: a
personal computer with a general purpose operating system.
It is often forgotten that cryptographic protocols cannot be
isolated of their environment. In the real world, operating
systems have not been created with security as a crucial design
criteria and, therefore, have critical vulnerabilities.
As a new example of this problem we can cite the new de-
veloped techniques for recovering private keys from a process
memory [10]. Again, the problem does not stem in the public
key paradigm, but in storing, even temporarily, a private key
in memory without other protection.
1) A real example: Silentbanker: The scale and sophistica-
tion of this recently discovered banking trojan is worrying. It
is able, for example, to targeting over 400 banks and having
the ability to circumvent two-factor authentication [11].
The ability of this trojan to perform man-in-the-middle at-
tacks on valid transactions is what is most worrying. The trojan
can intercept transactions that require two-factor authentication
and it can then silently change the user-entered destination
bank account details to the attacker’s account details instead.
Since the user does not notice anything wrong with the
transaction, they will enter the second authentication password,
in effect handing over its money to the attackers. The trojan
intercepts, as we have been in previous section, all of this
traffic before it is encrypted, so even if the transaction takes
place over SSL the attack is still valid.
D. Mobile phones
Recently, some banks have started to use mobile phones as
authentication tokens. The goal is to defeat the classic man-in-
the-middle attack carried out by a last generation trojan, since
authentication token travels along an independent path – an
SMS mobile phone network.
Since the communication now uses two channels, this
method is also known as a two-channel authentication or
out-of-band mechanism. Although majority of banks have
implemented this solution by using mobile phones, it can be
used with any telephone, not just mobile devices.
On the other hand, the banks apply this mechanism in
different stages of the online banking process. Some of them,
use the mechanism at log-in, and others just when a money
transfer is requested by the user.
Roughly speaking, the scheme is simple and it can be
described as follows:
• The user requests log-in or a money transfer.
• The banks sends a SMS to the user’s mobile phone with
a one time password, usually in the range of 4 to 8 digits.
• The customer must then manually copy the code from
their phone to confirm the transaction.
The advantages of this scheme are clear and it is supposed
effectively a more secure solution. It is attractive for both the
bank and the customer too, given that there is no additional
hardware token to issue or carry. On the other hand, it has
some drawbacks:
• Mobile phone cannot have coverage or run out of battery.
It can be forgotten or lost by the user. In some situations,
the user cannot have mobile phone at all.
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Scheme Technique Advantages Disavantages
Something you
are
Keystroke
dynamics
• No extra hardware
needed
• High user’s accept-
ability
• Not reliable.
• High enrollment time
Something you
know
Transfer
password Simple to use
Can be easily captured as login
credentials.
Something you
have
Matrix card Cheap and relatively sim-ple to use
• Can be lost or forgotten.
• Difficult to share
Hardware tokens Difficult to be tampered
• Expensive
• Can be lost or forgotten
• Difficult to share
Mobile phone No extra hardwareneeded.
• No coverage or run out of
battery
• Cost for bank
TABLE II
TWO-FACTOR AUTHENTICATIONS SCHEMES USED IN ONLINE BANKING
• The SMS delivery has a considerable cost for the bank,
which increases with the number of users and performed
transactions. In turn, this cost is usually charged to the
user.
• Some accounts, as a corporate account, need to be man-
aged by several persons, probably since different physical
locations. In this case, this scheme is extremely difficult
to be used.
Other important issue, which it is necessary to have into
account, is that information confirmation must include details
of the transaction itself. Otherwise an attacker could perform
a session hijacking attack and alter a transaction that the user
would confirm. Real trojans which already exploit this fact
were shown in section V-C1. In next section, a proposal to
securely include this information is presented and analyzed.
On the other hand, even if details are included in the SMS,
some authors have pointed out other interesting issues that can
still be applied. In [1] authors performed a study that finds that
one out of five online transactions were vulnerable to attack
despite the adoption of SMS passwords (more due to human
error than to a technical security problem). To simulate a trojan
MITM attack, the bank account number in the SMS message
was not the same as the intended account number and some
customers failed to notice this.
The research simulated an online bank and it was used by
more than 90 participants to undertake more than 700 financial
transactions using an SMS authorization code. Two types
of attacks were simulated - an obvious attack that involved
altering five or more digits in the account number, and a stealth
attack altering only one digit. The study showed that 21 per
cent of obvious attacks were successful, and 61 per cent of
stealth attacks succeeded.
It is clear that security includes usability, not just the
technical aspects of security and that banks must improve it
in their services. Therefore, a user interface should be used
in such a way that the user actively selects a transaction to
confirm. In any case, transaction analysis and confirmation,
when well implemented, can be effective and possibly the best
current mitigation countermeasure available.
VI. FUTURE SOLUTIONS
In this section some solutions to these problems are outlined
and a new method for generating OTP tokens using mobile
phones is presented and analyzed. Sections VI-B and VI-C
analyze solutions already found in the literature, that we
believe to be a effective way of dealing with the problems
of online banking authentication.
A. Phone OTP Token
As shown in previous section, it is important that infor-
mation confirmation sent to the user includes details of the
transaction itself, to avoid a real-time MITM attack.
Together with this information, an OTP challenge is sent in
the SMS message. This challenge has to be correctly repeated,
trough the Web channel, to successfully confirm the operation.
This challenge can be generated in different ways. Many
banks use just a random number, but this approach has
several disadvantages. The main is that it is necessary to store
information (the issued challenge, the account number, the
amount to transfer, etc...) for each requested operation and
every user. This scheme can be also prone to denial-of-service
attacks.
In this situation, it would be more adequate a state-less
protocol. Therefore, our goal is twofold:
• To obtain a state-less protocol, which makes unnecessary
to store information for each user and provides indepen-
dently verifiable challenges.
• To obtain a time-varying scheme, i.e., it should provide
different OTP values for the same user at different mo-
ments.
According to our proposal, the complete SMS message would
be composed of:
• Critical information to be protected, as account number,
amount to transfer and time of transaction. Optionally,
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Fig. 6. Phone OTP generation
other information could be included, as the name of the
destination bank.
• OTP token, generated by performing a HMAC over the
previous critical information with a server secret key, K.
For convenience reasons, the full output (e.g. of 160 bits)
can be reduced to only 24 bits, 6 hexadecimal characters,
which are user-friendly and large enough to defeat brute
force attacks. The process is shown in figure 6.
In such a way, the OTP value is cryptographically binded
to the financial information. In addition, this scheme allows
the server not to store per-user information. This reduces the
server load and avoids programming errors that can lead to
the compromise of information of other users [12].
B. Logical Countermeasures
We claim than any method that carries out the authentication
process entirely at the client side is not completely safe.
At this point, it seems clear that the only actors who can
really mitigate the problem until marginal levels are the
own banking organizations. This should be achieved through
detection approaches that, in any case, the banks have been
using for years for other types of frauds, such as the credit
card one.
One approach to reducing the risk is to concentrate on
online transactions that may be fraudulent. This is analogous
to the risk management measures that banks take in the
physical world: every credit card transaction is evaluated, and
suspicious transactions are checked with the customer.
An analysis of online transactions may be performed by
using a variety of metrics, such as the user’s IP address, the
presence of authentication information such as a cookie on the
user’s machine, the amount of a transaction, the destination
bank account, characteristics of the destination bank account,
and cross-account analysis of transactional patterns.
Other non-technical methods may include the capacity to
recover the transactions in a fast and effective way, although
have spent several days, or even months, since they were
carried out. In this sense, there are positive examples, like
PayPal, which considers the payments made by individuals
provisional for 180 days [3].
C. Dealing with Financial Benefit
Financial institutions have stated delays in certain types of
money transfers to allow the detection of accounts used in a
fraudulent way. If a fraudulent receiving account is identified
during the holding period, the transfer can be voided and the
economic damage can be avoided. Of course, this is useful to
law enforcement too. Often, attackers can be caught by tracing
the flow of money from the use of stolen credentials.
Real world examples include Barclays Bank, HBOS,
NatWest, and Royal Bank of Scotland, which have instituted
delays of between several hours and one day on online
transfers between two accounts within the same bank. The
delays, which apply the first time a transfer is attempted, are
intended to give the banks time to detect suspicious activity,
such as a large number of transfers from multiple accounts
into a single account.
The money-transfer delay was adopted in response to a
wave of phishing incidents in which thieves transferred funds
from victims’ bank accounts into accounts owned by ”mules”–
people duped through e-mail solicitations into opening ac-
counts, usually under the guise of a business proposal. From
the mule accounts, the thieves withdraw cash, open credit
cards, or empty the account.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we prove than current online banking is highly
insecure. All the currently used countermeasures implemented
by banks are vulnerable to some kind of attack, mainly to the
recent and powerful last generation trojans. A mobile phone
OTP scheme with a new proposal for the challenge generation
is presented.
In any case, the security of a system can be seen as a chain
of protection methods, and the global level is just as strong
as its weakest link. From this point of view, cryptography is
no more than other link in the chain. Most of the times, it is
probably the strongest link, but there are many others weak
links which decrease the security level until unacceptable level
for carrying out electronic commerce. In last term, exclusively
technical protection methods seem not to be able to completely
solve the situation. The focus should be changed towards
trying to increase the resistance of the system, instead of its
invulnerability that, in any case, cannot be completely achieved
in general purpose operating systems.
In the financial world there exist tools, like user behavior
profiling, which are starting to be considered, and that in fact,
have been used by the banks for many years in the “real world”
in form of back-end controls. From the dot com boom, banks
have tried to push the entire business logic, authentication
included, to the front end (the user’s computer), as it is easier
for them. Possibility of ubiquitous transactions and distinction
between ‘safe’ and ‘dangerous’ ones vanished too. All of
these get worse the cases of user’s identity or credential theft,
which need more advanced measures and, curiously, a return
of traditional back-end controls should be expected.
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